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Ownership Makes a Difference
NEW BOOKLET PUBLISHED
Marking the Fifteenth Anniversary of the Entrepreneur is a new booklet, " HIGH OCTANE?
A Primer on the Economics of the Energy
Crisis.'' Authored by Belden Center Director Dr.
Don Diffine, a complimentary copy of " HIGH OCTANE?" is available to our readers upon request.
Here are a few select paragraphs from the
introduction:
In the late 1970's, the service station
attendant said, "Fill it up?" Reluctantly, I replied, " Fill it up." He opened the
cash drawer and said, " Fill it up." I filled it up. Then he filled my gas tank,
doubling the value of my old, gas
guzzling car.
Today, those high gas prices again
make us feel as if we are " paying
through the hose." Aside from trying to
face the current energy crisis with a
sense of humor, fact is, gas is $1 more
per gallon in Canada - $2 more in
parts of Europe.
Have we been " fuelish"? Not really.
We have grown 54% in real GNP since
1973; and we did it with only 9% more
energy. We're not " energy pigs" any
more than our children whom we push
to go on in school are "education pigs."

Other sections in "HIGH OCTANE?" are titled,
"The Sun Will Still Rise.. .Oil In The Family... How
Many Crises? ...Creative Juices Will Flow... Energy
Facts Of Life In A Nutshell .. .Pay Your Money Take Your Choice."

by David M. Johnson, Ph.D.
Assistant Professor of Accounting
Harding University
The undeniable shift from nationalized economies to
privatized economies throughout Europe is a dream
becoming reality. Over the past few years, industrialize? _nations of the Free World have been pursuing
policies to unshackle industry from counterproductive
governm ent involvem ent. The theorists and
philosophers will continue to argue, but for most of us,
the evidence is in: private ownership is a survivor.
Addressing this issue, R. Joseph Monsen and Kenneth D. Walters have written a book, "Nationalized
Companies: A Threat to American Business," which
outlines the tremendous failure of government ownership at the test of profits and losses. By their account,
"the history of nationalized companies is written in red
ink." A few of their interesting findings are summarized
below.
In the period 1972-1981, the majority of the 25 largest
state-o':"ned industrial firms in Western Europe reported
losses in most years. The problem was growing by the
end of that period, with twice as many losers as winners. Furthermore, losses increased in size as the
decade wore on. These losses cannot be discounted
by arguing that these were depressed industries, for
they included basic manufacturing industries such as
chemicals, plastics, paper, aluminum, machine tools,
and fertilizers. In contrast, the 25 largest private companies in Europe reported few losses, and only one had
losses over an extended period.
As Monsen and Walters explain, the blame for this
record lies in the confused incentive structure of stateowned companies. These firms appear to be run for
political rather than economic reasons, in accordance
with a goal of maximizing votes rather than shareholder
wealth. The symptoms are now classic, but the cause
and the cure are no mystery. The separation of the

ownership of an asset and control (management) of that
asset will result in significant problems of resource
allocation.
Even as Americans congratulate themselves on the
ideological triumph of freedom over totalitarianism, a
trend has occurred on a microeconomic level resulting
in the separation of ownership and management in
large U.S. corp~rations. This separation can produce
problems for the individual firm not unlike those that
typify nationalized companies.

plant and equipment required tremendous amounts of
capital financing. The corporation proved the most efficient organizational form through which to obtain that
financing.
With expansion of the assets under management,
personal management by the manager/owner was impossible. At first, entrepreneurial managers were supplemented by professional managers; but it was only
a matter of time until professional managers were in
control. The result is the modern corporation, characterized by a widely dispersed stockholder group.

A LITTLE HISTORY

Until the Industrial Revolution, most manufacturing
and merchandising were conducted via home
businesses or small shops under the Handicraft
System; the predominant business forms were the sole
proprietorship and the partnership. Under this system,
an individual develops a particular skill to provide goods
or services that can be sold or exchanged for goods
or services desired by the producer. The scale of production is very small by present standards, although this
system still dominates in non-industrialized countries.
With improved transportation and production
technology, economies occur that encourage the expansion of operations. As these businesses grow,
employees are hired. At first, these few employees labor
under the watchful supervision of the owner, who is
ever-present and in close touch with the day-to-day
business operation.
The entrepreneur's presence gives personality to the
business, encourages efficiency, and ensures that the
business is managed for the benefit of th e
manager/owner. But as the business continues to expand, the entrepreneur is unable to maintain control
over operations as she once did. With growth comes
specialization of labor and management. Supervisors
are hired. At fi rst, they supplement the owner as
managers, but eventually supplant the manager/owner.
The Industrial Revolution accelerated this process on
a grand scale. Until the mid-1800's, the corporate
organizational form was primarily reserved for public
works projects such as bridges and canals. Investors
were composed of those who had a vested interest in
the project's completion. For example, a barge freight
line might be compelled to share in the ownership of
a canal project. But profit-oriented businesses were still
conducted as sole proprietorships or partnerships.
With the Revolution, the corporation became the
preferred form for for-profit businesses. Mechanization
and mass production methods allowed large-scale
manufacturing. The necessary large investments in

The stockholders, with rare exception, are uninvolved
in day-to-day operations, and management of the firm
falls to professionals who have very little ownership interest. Management decision-making, formerly the task
of the entrepreneur, is now the domain of the professional manager, who likely has no stake in the firm
whose future he or she is charting. The problems that
result are collectively referred to as " agency" problems
because the managers act as decision-making agents
on behalf of the firm's owners.
DESCRIBING THE PROBLEM

Separation of ownership and control of assets has
the potential to distort the incentives governing the
firm's decisions, leading to mis-allocation of resources
similar to that resulting from state ownership. Adam
Smith recognized the problems of separation of ownership and control, noting in 1776 in " The Wealth of Nations:"
The directors of such Ooint stock) companies,
however, being the managers rather of other people's money than of their own, it cannot well be
expected that they should watch over it with the
same anxious vigilance with which the partners
in private copartnery frequently watch over their
own.
Smith revealed tremendous insight for one so far
ahead of the day when large corporations would
dominate the economy. There, in the age of the butcher
and baker, he predicted the shift of incentives that would
accompany the rise of the modern corporation. It would
be over one hundred years before industrialization
would result in the dilution of manager ownership that
gave rise to the problem Smith suggested.
In the early 1930's, Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means
noted an increasing diffusion of corporate ownership
that left control in the hands of hired managers who had
little stock ownership. They predicted from this separation ill consequences for the national economy.

Private ownership works because the owners, acting
out of self-interest, provide valuable products and services to the consumer, jobs to employees, and tax
revenues to support public works. Their efforts to maximize personal wealth encourage efficient allocation of
resources to those activities that are desired most by
consumers. Without it, the profit motive - central to
the proper functioning of a free market - is absent.
Further, the owners know that higher risks are, in
general, rewarded with higher returns. Without the
critical connection between risk acceptance and return
enjoyment, the incentive to accept higher risk is absent.

SEPARATION AND THE INVESTMENT DECISION
By far the most crucial financial management decisions made by the firm are its investment decisions. Investments will determine the nature and size of the firm,
as well as its future profitability and long-term viability.
This decision may be adversely affected by the separation of ownership and control, resulting in sub-optimal
investments that fail to maximize firm value. The agency problems relating to sub-optimal investments may
be categorized as (1) excess perquisite consumption by
firm managers, (2) perversion of the incentive to accept
risk, and (3) perversion of the tendency to devote time
and effort to the business. The remainder of this article provides a discussion of these problems and a summary of the evidence regarding them .

EXCESS PERQUISITE CONSUMPTION
Perquisites - " perks" for short - are non-salary
employee benefits. Some examples of common perks
are: health benefits, free or subsidized cafeterias, use
of a corporate jet or auto, secretarial staff, office, and
retirement benefits. Some level of perquisites is
necessary, or at least beneficial to the firm. Excess perquisite consumption becomes a problem because we
all tend to order more when someone else is footing
the bill.
Say you and I go out to lunch. If I'm paying, I'll order
a salad; if you're paying, I'll have the buffet. A basic
economic principle governs - as the price of an
economic good falls, consumption of the good rises.
Suppose that I own 100% of the stock of a company
that I also manage. I will consume a certain amount of
perquisites, but I limit those because I know that the
money comes directly out of my pocket.
Now suppose that I sell half of my stock to you, but
maintain managerial control. Those perks which formerly cost me $1.00 now effectively cost me only$ .50...
you absorb the other half. In simple economic terms,
the cost of these perks has just been cut in half, and

being a sensible individual, I'll increase consumption.
The increased consumption above the previous level
represents an additional cost to the business. Note that
this additional consumption occurred because I am
receiving the full benefit of the perks but only paying
half the cost. The net increase in perks results solely
from separation of ownership and control.
Whenever popular business magazines feature the
astronomical salaries and benefits of top management
groups, they raise questions about agency problems.
Are these salaries in the shareholders' interests, or are
they symptomatic of agency problems? Many of us have
read with disbelief the accounts of how the officers and
directors of U.S. Steel in the 1970's enjoyed gourmet
luncheons among silver settings and extravagant furnishings while the company - and the stockholders
- were losing money hand over fist. Similar conditions
occurred at Chrysler, but your own experience likely can
yield more meaningful examples. These serve to remind
us that agency problems indeed exist in the form of excess perk consumption.

REDUCING THE TENDENCY TO ACCEPT RISK
The second element of the agency problem
associated with the firm's investments is the tendency
for managers to avoid risk-taking as their ownership of
the firm's equity declines. The risk/return tradeoff that
stockholders face is very different from that of creditors.
The claims of bondholders on corporate earnings is
fixed while that of stockholders is residual. The creditor
does not enjoy the fruits of exceptional performance,
but may lose his fixed return if performance is sufficiently poor to jeopardize his claims.
Facing this tradeoff, the creditor will recommend to
the corporation a relatively conservative course of action - slow growth occasioned by minimal risk, with
few ventures into unfamiliar operations. This is one
reason that too much debt in the corporate capital structure is costly to the firm - with debt comes debt
covenants, some of which restrict the firm's managerial
flexibility in pursuing new investment opportunities.
A corporate manager whose compensation is based
primarily on salary is effectively a creditor of the company. His fixed salary is by nature a debt claim, and
barring other counterincentives, we can expect him to
chart a conservative course for the firm.
Compensation packages that include stock and stock
options are adopted in attempts to realign interests of
managers with those of common stockholders. By making managers' compensation (and wealth) dependent
on the market value of the stock, stockholders hope to
offset the distorted incentives wrought by ownership-

diffusion. But the only way to truly align manager interests with those of shareholders is to make compensation entirely dependent on the value of the common
stock. I don't know of any firm that uses such a compensation arrangement.
A firm that shuns risk will necessarily shy away from
innovation and new product or market development,
thereby reducing its ability to compete in a world where
being in the forefront is critical to survival. Reducing
the tendency to accept risk may be a tremendous
malefactor bearing on a nation's ability to compete in
a high-tech era.

REDUCING ENTREPRENEURIAL EFFORT

The third agency problem is closely related to the
other two. Diluting insider ownership simultaneously
dilutes the incentives to commit time, effort, and energy
to the business. The result is a reduction in entrepreneurial effort devoted to the business.
Students in Finance 101 learn on Day One that the
goal of the firm is to maximize shareholder wealth. For
the corporation, this translates into maximizing the
stock's market price. Although some argue that this goal
is incomplete, most would admit that the firm exists
primarily for the benefit of its owners, the stockholders.
Their interests are therefore paramount.
But modern corporate managers often have been
labeled "satisficers" rather than "maximizers" of
shareholder wealth. Maximizing requires choosing the
best alternative from among those available. Satisficing requires only that managers attain some minimum
acceptable result. And since shareholders of widely
held corporations are not apprised of the alternatives
facing management, there is no basis by which to judge
whether managers are maximizing or simply satisficing.
There is reason to be skeptical that managers voluntarily choose to maximize shareholder wealth. Much like
the "straight-A'' student whose parents take their child's
consistent top performance for granted, managers find
that superior performance in one year results first in approbation, but later to increased expectations - or
demands. Furthermore, if their efforts are not directly
tied to rewards, then the connection is fuzzy,
incomplete.
Return now to the sole owner who sold half-interest
in his business, and now as a partial owner consumes
more perks than before. The manager/owner is also inclined to consume more leisure time than before; that
is, he is inclined to exert less effort in the conduct of
his business. After all, why over-exert oneself when
others reap much of the benefit?

"Shirking," the reduction in entrepreneurial effort applied to the business, applies not only to time devoted
to the business, but also to creative energies that
characterize the helmsmen of vigorous, competitive, innovative firms. The agency cost here is by nature an
opportunity loss - the potential wealth foregone by virtue of undiscovered, unpursued investment opportunities - and may represent the greatest cost of agency problems.

DOCUMENTING THE PROBLEM

Proposing these problems is one thing - documenting them is another. For the last ten years or so, much
research effort has been directed at determining how
the separation of ownership and control manifests itself
in corporate financial policies and performance.
The investment decision reflects the firm's strategy
and determines its profitability and survivability. An interesting aspect of the investment decision concerns
the firm's attitude toward corporate diversification via
mergers and acquisitions.
Because salaried managers' interests are aligned
with those of the firm's creditors, they will be interested
in reducing the riskiness of the firm's investments. One
way to do so is by diversification . Financial theory holds
that corporate diversification is of little value to
stockholders - it is relatively easy and inexpensive for
individuals to diversify their stockholdings, especially
with the proliferation of mutual funds.
In contrast, diversification of real assets is expensive
and the cost of a mistake is much greater (e.g., diversifying into areas outside management's sphere of expertise, then having to divest at bargain-basement
prices for survival's sake - Beatrice a case in point).
So diversification by the corporation is of questionable
benefit, at least to stockholders. If the stockholder owns
a well-diversified portfolio, the failure of one stock would
have limited adverse impact on her wealth since the
other stocks would be unaffected and might even
benefit from the failure.
To the manager, however, salary represents the
primary source of income, and the corporation's survival is a prime determinant of personal wealth. If the
corporation founders or fails, the manager may find
himself standing in the unemployment line, the
possessor of a tainted resu me. To reduce this risk, the
manager may recommend corporate diversification so
that the corporation's survival is better assured, not being dependent on the success of a single line of
business.

Research aimed at investigating the relationship between corporate characteristics and the level of
manager ownership provides interesting evidence on
the problems outlined above. One study reveals that
firms with low manager ownership have a tendency to
carry relatively higher levels of liquid assets (primarily
cash, marketable securities, and inventories) than firms
with high insider ownership. A high level of liquid assets
is usually associated with a conservative, or even defensive, operational policy. This study suggests that firms
with low manager ownership pursue more conservative
policies related to investment in working capital than
otherwise similar firms with high manager ownership.
Another aspect of the firm's investment decision
relates to corporate diversification. As explained above,
diversification is of little benefit to the well-diversified
stockholder, but may be of great value to the manager
whose wealth is dependent primarily on the survival of
the corporation.
Recent studies suggest that firms with low manager
ownership pursue conglomerate mergers to a much
greater degree than of high-manager-ownership firms.
Conglomerate mergers, by definition , represent combinations of unrelated businesses. As a result, synergies
- where the combined result is greater than the sum
of the parts - can not be used as justification for the
mergers. Instead, they are pursued to obtain greater
diversification of the firm's operations, and thereby to
reduce risk. This suggests that the incentives to diversify the firm's operations is different for the firms with
high manager ownership and those with low manager
ownership.
Another recent study finds that managers with small
amounts of stock ownership are more opposed to
takeovers of their companies than are managers with
high amounts of stock ownership. Stockholders of target
companies usually realize substantial increases in
wealth as a direct result of takeover attempts; managers
of firms that are acquired usually are released once the
acquisition is accomplished. Target company managers
with small amounts of stock ownership stand to lose
much in a successful takeover, and try to thwart the
attempt.
In summary, evidence suggests that the most crucial
decision facing financial managers - the investment
decision - is significantly influenced by the level of
manager stock ownership. Managers who are not
owners pursue financial goals which may not be in the

best interests of stockholders. In general, these policies
suggest a more conservative attitude than is the case
for manager-owners.
MANAGER OWNERSHIP AND RETURN ON
INVESTMENT

It is fairly common to find investment advisors who
recommend stocks of companies on the basis of high
stock ownership by firm managers. The arguments are
sensible and, in fact, follow from the suggestions made
above - managers with high stock ownership have
greater incentive to work harder, stick their necks out,
and not waste assets on silly investments.
Unfortunately, the matter isn't at all clear. Writers who
propose " evidence" that manager ownership produces
superior returns usually rely only on a few select examples. They cite a few cases of successful companies
where owners are active in management - Sam Walton
and Wal-mart as an example - and conclude that high
manager ownership will produce equally superior
returns in other firms. That may be, but isolated examples do not a reliable investment rule make.
Simply stated, empirical evidence doesn't suggest
any consistent relationship between the level of
manager ownership and the returns on common stock.
A number of problems exist in measuring such things,
most of them concerned with adjusting for the relative
riskiness of the stocks. Barring a breakthrough in
developing better measurement tools, the investor
should be aware that the evidence does not support the
often-made claim that stocks of high-managerownership firms outperform others.
CONCLUSION

Agency theory proposes that the separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation produces
conflicts of interest within the firm that.lead to management decisions that are not in the stockholders' best
interests. Research suggests that these conflicts produce problems which are manifested in the firm's investment policies.
Many firms have recognized these potential problems, and have responded by making stock ownership
and stock option plans a part of the management compensation package. These attempt to realign manager
and shareholder interests to encourage managers to
act more like owners.

The ENTREPRENEUR is a quarterly journal and newsletter addressing contemporary economic issues from a
moral perspective. One may not agree with every word printed in the ENTREPRENEUR series, nor should one
feel he needs to do so. It is hoped that the reader will think about the points laid out in the publication, and then
decide for himself.

